Ironically, the characteristic of light rail which most lowered its cost (compared to heavy rail), has largely been eliminated in almost all modern day implementations in the U.S. Thus, cities get a light rail system at a heavy rail cost. The public is led to believe they can pay for a light rail system, but have it customized to resemble heavy rail at no extra expense. This is all done by slight of labels, calling it 'light rail' for public consumption while paying a heavy rail bill. And, since no one is actually responsible for the results, we frequently get a hybrid that is a poor solution for the market to be served, and therefore a poor value.
NATIONAL SURVEY OF LIGHT RAIL LINES IN PLANNING: 1999 & 2000 | ||||
Line | Capital Cost (Millions) | Miles | Cost per Mile (000,000) | Cost Increase Notes |
Austin | $739 | 14.6 | $50.62 | |
Cincinnati | $875 | 19.0 | $46.05 | |
Dallas | $517 | 12.5 | $41.38 | |
Denver | $883 | 19.0 | $46.45 | Cost per mile up 54 percent from 1999. |
Houston | $300 | 7.5 | $40.00 | |
Kansas City-Southtown | $248 | 5.6 | $44.23 | 2000 data not available |
Minneapolis | $549 | 11.5 | $47.70 | Cost per mile up 30 percent from 1999 |
New Jersey: Hudson-Bergen II | $1,113 | 6.1 | $182.43 | |
Norfolk | $525 | 18.3 | $28.67 | |
Orange County | $2,015 | 26.6 | $75.75 | Cost per mile up 10 percent from 1999 |
Orlando | $600 | 14.6 | $41.10 | 2000 data not available |
Phoenix (2000) | $884 | 18.5 | $47.78 | Cost per mile up 59 percent from 1999 |
Portland-Interstate | $350 | 5.6 | $62.50 | |
Portland-North South | $1,186 | 12.0 | $98.83 | 2000 data not available |
Salt Lake City | $106 | 2.5 | $42.30 | Different route from 1999. |
San Diego-Mid Coast | $123 | 3.4 | $36.18 | Cost per mile up 18 percent from 1999 |
San Diego-Mission Valley | $431 | 5.9 | $73.05 | Cost per mile up 19 percent from 1999. |
San Francisco | $500 | 5.4 | $92.61 | Cost per mile up 16 percent from 1999. |
Seattle | $1,500 | 7.2 | $208.33 | Shorter route, cost per mile up 71 percent from 1999 |
Average | $68.74 | Average up 22 percent from 1999. | ||
Source: FY 2000 and 2001 FTA New Starts report (published in 1999 and 2000) |
Local infighting over 'light' and 'heavy' transit resulted in this hybrid that runs lower capacity and slower vehicles in unimpeded, but less accessible, right-of-ways. Its costs increased while its benefits, as measured by success in meeting the needs of consumers, decreased. The hybrid product is mostly popular with the few for whom it is convenient and/or those who've had little exposure to other urban transit systems.
One of the first, and largest, 'light' rail systems in the U.S. is in Portland. In the commercial/business heart of the city, 2-car trains run on existing streets in designated/reserved lanes, sometimes on closed streets for short distances when ample right of ways are present. The beauty of light rail is its ability to be easily accessible to patrons and to provide convenient access to final destinations. This urban core implementation of the Portland system is by far its most popular feature.
Light rail implemented in a heavy rail infrastructure. |
With a metro population of 2.2 million and 52 miles of rail transit, it should have far more than 59,500 weekday commuters (119,000 boardings) riding its rails. By comparison, the Boston transit system, serving roughly twice the population with 64 miles of urban rail (38 miles of heavy rail, 26 of light rail), transports 354,900 weekday riders each way (709,800 boardings).
For Portland, with a city population density half that of Boston, this may be the best it can achieve, as demand may be insufficient to justify heavy rail transit. Yet, the cost for a light rail implementation in this manner has costs approaching that of heavy rail. The speed of light rail would be better marketed to in-town commutes, but its implementation (meant to attract metro commuters) has made it less accessible, and therefore less convenient for the in-town market. The attempt to attract metro Portland commuters was futile, as its speed is too slow to make up for the other inconveniences of giving up a personal vehicle. Thus, it attracts only a narrow portion of its potential market and makes it a highly expensive system per passenger.
Light rail infrastructure was originally characterized by right of ways more closely integrated into existing street systems, though not necessarily in mixed traffic. Elaborate grade separations, which are also obstacles to passenger access, are unnecessary and, though cross traffic inhibitors may have existed in prior times, today technological innovations permit road traffic signals to be triggered by approaching trams. This signal control allows priority passage for these vehicles, virtually eliminating cross traffic as an issue.
Like Portland's implementation of light rail outside of its core, the GLX proposal in Boston has some of the standard features of heavy rail, segregated right of way and stations spaced at least a half mile apart. It virtually gives up all of the wonderful features which make light rail attractive, while attempting to fill the shoes best left to another transit mode. Both heavy and light rail should be recognized for their unique attributes and functions and used for the needs to which they best apply. Both modes have their place and both should tie into Boston's current transit system.